what does the economy owe young people?

A new social contract must ask more of the economy, not just young people. As housing, work and financial security become increasingly difficult to attain, we need to rethink what people should reasonably expect in return for their contribution to society.

We have become very good at explaining what young people owe the economy. They must acquire the right skills, remain adaptable, compete for opportunities, retrain when industries change and take responsibility for their own futures. They are told to work hard, make sensible choices and become financially independent. What receives considerably less attention is the other side of the arrangement: what does the economy owe them?

It is a question that sits beneath the debate over youth unemployment, but cannot be answered by employment policy alone. A job matters. So does being able to afford somewhere to live, start a family, look after someone, save for the future and participate in the society whose economy one is helping to sustain. If work is supposed to provide the foundations of an independent life, then we should be asking why so many people find that working is no longer enough.

The recent review led by Alan Milburn has brought this problem back into political focus. Its proposals recognise that young people's exclusion from employment cannot be addressed simply by telling them to try harder. Better employment support, apprenticeships, training and help for those facing health barriers all have a place. Andy Burnham has also argued that the response must extend beyond changing benefit entitlements: young people need opportunity, hope and support that recognises the circumstances surrounding unemployment, including housing, debt and mental health.

That is an important distinction. But it also opens up a larger question. If the barriers facing young people are rooted in the organisation of the economy and society, how far should our response go beyond helping individuals navigate them?

There is a danger in treating the transition into adulthood as a problem of getting people into work, as though employment were the final destination rather than one part of a much wider life. A person can be employed and still be unable to afford independent housing. They can have qualifications but no realistic prospect of progression. They can work full-time and remain unable to save, plan or make commitments beyond the next payday. Employment figures might record a successful outcome; the person living that outcome may experience something rather different.

This is not an argument that work has lost its value. It is an argument that we have narrowed our idea of what work should make possible. For much of the post-war period, the promise attached to employment was not simply a wage. It was a route towards a degree of independence: the ability to establish a home, support a family and expect that years of contribution would bring greater security.

That promise was never universal. Women were excluded from many of its protections, racial inequalities shaped access to opportunity, and working-class security was often more fragile than the nostalgia suggests. But the principle that economic participation should bring some material stake in society is worth defending, and extending.

The language of a social contract helps explain what has changed. It describes the reciprocal obligations between individuals and the society they inhabit. Citizens contribute through work, taxation, care and participation in public life. In return, they can reasonably expect institutions that protect their rights, share risks, and provide the conditions for decent lives. The contract is not a historical document that everyone signed. It is the implicit bargain that gives collective life its legitimacy.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau asked how people could live together under political arrangements that served the common good rather than simply protecting the interests of the powerful. His earlier writing on inequality warned that institutions ostensibly established for everyone's protection could become instruments for securing the advantages of those who already possessed property. John Rawls offered another test of fairness: would we accept the principles governing society if we did not know what position we would occupy within it? Behind his 'veil of ignorance', we might find it rather harder to justify a system in which the security of one's future depends so heavily on inherited wealth.

“A contract in which only one side is expected to keep its obligations is not a contract at all.”

These questions are not abstract. They expose a striking imbalance in the way responsibility is distributed across the economy. Consider the different expectations placed on someone looking for work and a business seeking to recruit. The individual may face conditions, appointments, sanctions and pressure to demonstrate that they are doing everything possible to change their circumstances. The employer, meanwhile, may be offered subsidies, tax relief or publicly funded support to encourage them to take on staff.

There are legitimate reasons to support employers and help people into work. But the contrast is revealing. When individuals struggle, the instinct is often to change their behaviour. When businesses struggle, the instinct is more readily to change the conditions around them. One is expected to adapt to the economy; the other is offered assistance to make the economy work for it.

This is not simply a question of whether welfare policy is too punitive or business support too generous. It is about whose circumstances are treated as a collective concern and whose are treated as a personal responsibility. A genuinely reciprocal economy would recognise that businesses need viable conditions in which to operate, but so do the people whose labour makes them possible. Responsibility cannot run in only one direction.

What, then, should young people be able to expect in return for their contribution? Not a guarantee that every ambition will be realised, or that economic life can be insulated from uncertainty. But a reasonable prospect of security that does not depend on family wealth. Housing that is accessible as a place to live, rather than primarily an asset to accumulate. Work that offers fair pay, dignity and a route to progression. Education that develops people's capacities rather than treating them as units of labour to be allocated to current vacancies. And the time and material security to care for others, build relationships and participate in community life.

These are not separate concessions to a particularly deserving age group. They are the conditions that allow people to contribute to society in the first place. An economy that cannot support people to form households, care for children, look after relatives or plan beyond the immediate future is not simply failing individuals. It is undermining the social foundations on which its own success depends.

There is also a democratic dimension to this bargain. A social contract cannot be something designed for people without their involvement. If young people are expected to accept decisions about housing, work, education and public spending, they must have meaningful opportunities to shape those decisions. The answer to declining trust cannot simply be to encourage more participation in institutions that offer little evidence that participation changes anything. People need more than an invitation to engage; they need a stake in what follows.

Nor should this become an argument between generations. The security older people have fought for should not be taken away to make room for younger people. The triple lock, for instance, reflects a political decision that poverty in retirement is unacceptable. The question is why the same seriousness about security is so rarely applied to the decades before retirement. Why should protection from insecurity become a legitimate collective responsibility only after a lifetime of work?

The answer cannot be to lower expectations until the existing economy appears adequate. Nor can it be to promise young people that, with enough training, flexibility and determination, they will eventually find their place within it. That simply makes the individual responsible for reconciling themselves to conditions over which they have little control.

A new social contract would begin from a different premise: the economy exists to serve society, not the other way around. Its success should be measured not only by how many people it employs, how much it produces or how attractive it is to investors, but by whether it gives people the material freedom to live, contribute and plan for the future.

We should stop asking only how to prepare young people for the economy they are inheriting, and start asking what kind of economy is worth inheriting. If society expects a generation to work, care, contribute and take responsibility for its future, it must offer something more substantial in return than the promise that things might eventually get better. A contract in which only one side is expected to keep its obligations is not a contract at all.

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